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Abstract
In the Gordon-Schaefer model (G-S model), widely used to design ﬁsheries man-
agement policy, only resource stock dynamic is considered and carrying capacity is
constant. We propose an extension to the G-S model that incorporates the dynamics
of carrying capacity as an indicator of dynamics of the marine habitats. The study
yields two main ﬁndings. First, we demonstrate that habitats matter, by showing that
the main outcomes of the G-S model are dramatically modiﬁed if habitats are included
in the analysis. Second, through a heuristic model and simulations, we show, for the
ﬁrst time, that our extended model provides an appropriate framework to analyse the
putative contribution of MPAs and ARs. The model presented in this article opens
the way to a better understanding of the beneﬁts of MPAs and ARs, as well as other
habitat protection policies.
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1 Introduction
There have been many attempts to preserve ﬁshing resources by various management tools
such as access limitations, quotas, taxes or subsidies. Most of such ﬁsheries management
recommendations stems from the traditional approach to ﬁsheries economics (Clark, 1990,
2006) based on Schaefer (1954) and Gordon (1954). Over the years, it has become obvious
that these tools have not succeeded in avoiding the severe decline of commercial species
and of marine resources in general. Speciﬁcally, the economics tools do not seem fully
appropriate resource conservation because of the pressure on non-target components of
marine ecosystems (see for example Reiss et al. (2010) on the case of TACs). The incidental
capture of targeted species and other components of the marine ecosystem or "by-catch"
problem, is one of the major issues facing commercial ﬁsheries, since it can aﬀect the
structure and function of marine systems at the population, community and ecosystem
levels (Hall et al., 2000).
As a result, not only are most commercial stocks are currently overexploited (Lauck
et al., 1998; Castilla, 2000; FAO, 2006), but entire trophic webs and habitats may be
disrupted at the ecosystem level (Harrington et al., 2005). Recent studies such as Pikitch
et al. (1998), Powers and Monk (1988), or Worm et al. (2006) promote a new vision for
ﬁsheries management. According to them, ecosystem attributes must be integrated into
management and successful management cannot be achieved without a clear understanding
of biological processes at an ecosystem level. A major challenge is to incorporate this new
approach to marine resource management into standard mathematical models traditionally
used in ﬁsheries economics. The standard framework of ﬁsheries economics was developed
from seminal strudies by Schaefer (1954) and Gordon (1954). This model, referred to
as the Gordon-Schaefer model (hereafter, G-S model), has allowed managers to obtain
quantitative recommandations. In this paper, we incorporate into the G-S model ecosystem
concerns such as changes in the habitat of the targeted species of the ﬁshery.
Indeed, following Barbault and Sastrapradja (1995) and Sala et al. (2000), a major
threat to marine biodiversity is habitat degradation. These authors state that, it is not
possible to protect species and their ecological functions without ﬁrst protecting their
habitats. Burke et al. (2000) show that marine areas have endure high levels of habitat
destruction with about one-ﬁfth of marine coastal areas having been highly modiﬁed by
humans. For example, coral reefs which support a high ﬁsh species diversity continue to
decline. It is therefore vital to combat marine habitat degradation.
2
To this end, new policies have been implemented. In 1992, the European Council
established the "Habitats Directive" 1 which considers the conservation of natural habitats
as one of the essential objectives of general interest pursued by the European Community.
For marine habitats, the directive aims at encouraging the conservation of essential habitats
in order to maintain marine biodiversity in Europe. Some years earlier (1986) a similar
program for the management of marine habitats was developed by the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans of Canada. Its objective was an overall net gain in productive capacity
of marine habitats by means of the active conservation of the current productive capacity
of habitats, the recovery of damaged marine habitats and the development of habitats. To
adress these ecosystem concerns, ﬁsheries management tools like marine protected areas
(hereafter MPAs, see Kar and Matsuda (1998); Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2001, 2005))
and artiﬁcial reefs (hereafter ARs, see Pickering and Whitmarsh (1997); Pickering et al.
(1998)) were developed with the clear objective of supporting ﬁsheries via preserved or
restored ecosystems and habitats.
However, the ﬁeld of ﬁsheries economics oﬀers no theoritical support knowledge re-
garding the management of marine habitats. To our knowledge, there has only been one
attempt to integrate habitats into the analysis of optimal ﬁsheries management based on
the G-S model. Holland and Schnier (2006) studied the possibility of implementing an
individual habitat quota system to achieve habitat conservation via economic incentives.
They adapted the G-S model by integrating habitat stock endowed with its own dynamics.
By simulating the model, they investigated the conditions in which an individual habi-
tat quota regime is more cost-eﬀective than an MPA. Although, their model establishes
no connection between ﬁsh dynamics and the evolution of habitats. On the other hand,
Naiman and Latterell (2005) clearly state that ﬁsh production is dynamic both on species
and in habitats. Yet there is no framework incorporating this important dimension to
ﬁsheries management.
In this context, therefore the G-S model needs to be adapted. Degradation or improve-
ment of marine habitats must be taken into account to produce new quantitiative ﬁsheries
management recommendations. It is no straightforward, however to incorporate "habitat"
into the G-S model and deﬁning "habitat" is actually beyond both the scope of this paper
and the scope of economic theory. We adopt a very rough deﬁnition of habitat as a speciﬁc
area or environment in which a plant or a species lives. "Habitat" provides all the basic
1Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the "`conservation of natural habitats and of wild
fauna and ﬂora".
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requirements for survival. On the other hand, carrying capacity is traditionally interpreted
as a maximal population level that can be supported in a given marine area. It is one of
the determinants of ﬁsh stock dynamics and a major parameter in the G-S model. On
the other hand, Griﬀen and Drake (2008) have found that carrying capacity is inﬂuenced
by habitat size and quality and is correlated with extinction time: larger habitats support
populations with higher carrying capacities; higher quality habitats support populations
with higher carrying capacities (see also Pimm et al. (1988); Hakoyama et al. (2000)). The
evolution of an area's carrying capacity results from that of marine habitats present in the
area and it can be stated that there is a positive relationship between habitat and carrying
capacity; if habitat in a marine area improves (degrades), so does carrying capacity in the
marine area. Thus, carrying capacity can be considered as depending on natural habitat
rehabilitation processes or man-made habitat rehabilitation processes (for example ARs)
and on habitat alterations due to natural processes or induced by ﬁshing.
Here, therefore we propose an extension to the G-S model that incorporates the dynamics
of "habitats" through the dynamics of carrying capacity in a single-species model.
Carrying capacity now cease to be a parameter and becomes a state variable endowed
with its own dynamics in our model. In this ﬁrst approach, we assume that carrying
capacity dynamics depends entirely on habitat dynamics. The latter assumption is clearly
too simple to model the complex processes occurring in actual marine ecosystems2. Yet
it allows us to address the question of ﬁsheries management at ecosystem level with a
relatively simple model design and to obtain some signiﬁcant results. In particular, we
demonstrate that ignoring habitat dynamics can lead to inappropriate design of ﬁsheries
management tools. Bionomic equilibria and optimal harvest policies are explored in the
following sections using analytic models and computer simulation models that explicitly
incorporate dynamics of habitat via carrying capacity dynamics.
In the next section we present our new model incorporating habitat dynamics. In
section 3 biological and bionomic equilibrums are characterized and Maximum Sustainable
Yield (MSY) is determined in this new framework. In section 4 the problem of optimal
management is addressed and Maximum Sustainble Yield (MSY) and Maximum Economic
Yield (MEY) are calculated in the model. In section 5, we build a heuristic model that
allows us to compare ﬁsheries indicators as MEY and MSY between our model and G-S
2There are many studies about the relationship between habitats and abundance (Gratwicke and
Speight, 2005). Habitats and particularly their complexity are foundamental to explain species rich-
ness and abundance. The workshop on "`Economics and biological impacts of ARs"' organized by "`Aix
Marseille University"' in 2010 addresses this issue.
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model. Then, by means of simulations, we study the use of various management tools
like "open access", optimal mangement, MPAs, ARs, gear restrictions, with both models.
Finally, we conclude and discuss future perspectives.
2 The model
We begin by describting the G-S model. We then detail how the model is extended so that
habitat concerns can be taken into account in the analysis of optimal ﬁsheries management,
as explained section 3.
2.1 Gordon-Schaefer model
Following Schaefer (1954), the biomass x of a given ﬁsh species obeys the following equa-
tion:
x˙ = F (x)−H(x,E) (1)
where F (x) is the natural growth rate of the ﬁsh population while H(x,E) is the harvest
rate.
The standard assumptions on the above functions are as follows (Clark, 1990):
H(x,E) = qxE where q is a constant parameter called the catchability coeﬃcient and E
is a variable called the ﬁshing eﬀort. More generally, the harvest function can be written
as H(x,E) = vρ(t)E with v catchability coeﬃcient per unit of density and ρ(t) referred to
as the mean density. When ρ(t) is proportional to x(t), we get the standard Schaefer model.
F (x) = rx
(
1− xK
)
with r the intrinsic growth rate and K the area's environmental car-
rying capacity or saturation level for a given ﬁsh species. The function F is called logistic
law. It was ﬁrst formulated by Verhulst in 1838 in order to study population growth and
assumes that growth is limited by the availability of resources like light, space, nutrients
or water. In this context, the population increases at rate r up to a given K, the environ-
mental carrying capacity.
In the context of ﬁshery, resources for growth are provided by marine habitats that
shelter ﬁsh and provide means of survival. In line with this, any degradation of habitats
induced by ﬁshing gear and resulting in disturbance of one (or more) of their functions
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implies a decline in the area's carrying capacity for a given ﬁsh species (Turner et al.,
1999).3 Conversely, resources and habitat can be improved through implementation of
policies like MPAs or ARs, leading to increased carrying capacity.
2.2 Incorporating habitat considerations
In Gordon-Schaefer model, it is assumed that ﬁshing activities only degrade the resource.
However, as explained above, certain ﬁshing gears also deteriorate marine habitats. Since
habitats are linked to the parameter K, the ﬁshers employing that kind of gears are also
expected to impact the carrying capacity K of the marine area. We hence modify the G-S
model by considering K as a state variable endowed with its own dynamics as follows:
K˙ = D(K)−G(E,K) (2)
where D(K) is the growth rate of carrying capacity K driven by habitat rehabilitation
and G(E,K) is the loss rate of K induced by habitat degradation. Since ﬁshing has a
considerable eﬀect on the habitat and thus on the carrying capacity K of the concerned
area, we focus on this aspect of habitat degradation.
D(K) is assumed to reﬂect the growth of the fauna and ﬂora populations in the habitats
on which the targeted ﬁsh species is ecologically dependent. The function D(K) embodies
not only natural recovery of habitats but also artiﬁcial recovery through policies such as
ARs and creation of new habitats as MPAs. A marine area being limited, it cannot support
an inﬁnite quantity of ﬁsh and thus its carrying capacity is bounded by an upper limitKmax.
In the same manner, habitat degradation signiﬁes any alteration of habitats by natural
processes or, of particular relevance here, through poor management. It is well known
that some ﬁshing techniques, like trawling, compromise habitat functions required for ﬁsh
survival. Habitat degradation aﬀects carrying capacity through the function G(E,K).
Using equation (2), diﬀerent situations can be depicted via the choice of functions D
and G. For example, G = 0 represents being forced to use habitat-friendly ﬁshing methods,
or the absence of ﬁshing in the marine area in question. In these cases, marine habitats
recover and an area's carrying capacity can increase to its maximum Kmax. Similarly, if
degradation processes are stronger than natural or artiﬁcial restoration of habitats, i.e.
G > D, carrying capacity can fall to almost zero and ﬁsh can disappear from the area.
3We simplify by aﬃrming that damaging habitats inﬂuences only the carrying capacity of the area.
Decline in ﬁsh quality is a possible consequence of such agressive ﬁshing and, as a result, its market price
also decreases.
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2.3 Extended Gordon-Schaefer model
In our model, two state variables x and K are considered, each endowed with its own
dynamics:
x˙ = F (x,K)−H(x,E,K), (3)
K˙ = D(K)−G(E,K) (4)
with initial conditions x(0) = x0,K(0) = K0 and where functions F and H are as follows:
F (x,K) = rx
(
1− x
K
)
, (5)
H(x,E,K) = vE
x
K
(6)
In this extension to the G-S model, the link between the dynamics of ﬁsh biomass and
the dynamics of habitats is taken into account by means of carrying capacity (see Figure
1). By damaging the habitats located in the area, ﬁshing impacts carrying capacity and
hence disturbs the natural growth rate of ﬁsh populations. Furthermore, the design of the
extended model reﬂects that harvests depend on ﬁsh density subject to both ﬁsh stock
dynamics and carrying capacity dynamics. The density ρ(t) is here deﬁned as the ratio
x(t)
K(t) . It should be noted here that in the Schaefer equation, lower stock level implies lower
harvest. With (6), we maintain this interpretation but express it in terms of density. For a
given level of ﬁsh stock and a given level of ﬁshing eﬀort, higher carrying capacity implies
lower mean density and hence lower harvests via the catchability coeﬃcient per unit of
density v.
2.4 Basic speciﬁcation
In this section we specify the functions of the model (3)-(4) and describe variable behavior
in this model.
To get straight comparisons with the G-S model, we start by assuming that D obeys
the logistic law and G has a form similar to that of harvest function H, then
x˙ = rx
(
1− x
K
)
− vEx
K
(7)
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Figure 1: This scheme illustrates connexions between diﬀerent components of the model.
It shows the role of marine habitats in the behaviour of ﬁsh populations and hence in the
formation of the economic proﬁt of ﬁshery.
K˙ = τK
(
1− K
Kmax
)
− γEK (8)
where τ is the growth rate of K driven by habitat recovery (or "growth"), γ is the loss
rate of K due to habitat alteration caused by aggressive ﬁshing and Kmax is the area's
maximum possible carrying capacity.
Let us state the main characteristics of the model (7)-(8). Note that the assumptions
concerning the dynamics of carrying capacity are interpreted from the perspective of habi-
tats because, as noted previously, they are supposed to entirely determine the behavior of
K.
1) Properties of the natural growth rate of ﬁsh population F (x,K):
(1a) F has a parabolic shape and ∂
2F
∂x2
< 0; Given K, the population grows up to K,
the saturation level.
(1b) ∂F∂K > 0 and (1c)
∂2F
∂K2
< 0;
According to (1b), ﬁsh biomass grows faster in a marine area with larger carrying
capacity. This means that higher availability of habitats encourages ﬁsh reproduction.
(1c) indicates that the contribution of K to ﬁsh biomass growth rate F decreases as K
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increases.
2) Properties of the harvest function H(x,K,E):
(2a) ∂H∂x > 0, (2b)
∂H
∂E > 0 and (2c)
∂H
∂K < 0;
H can be interpreted as a production function with constant returns to scale, with E
and x the "factors of production". (2a) and (2b) are the usual conditions : the output
increases with increasing inputs E and x. (2c) can be interpreted as follows: for a given
level of ﬁsh stock x and a given level of ﬁshing eﬀort E, higher carrying capacity leads to
a lower mean density of ﬁsh, which is why it is more diﬃcult to catch them.
3) Properties of the carrying capacity growth rate D(K):
(3a) D has a parabolic shape and ∂
2D
∂K2
< 0;
Since habitat recovery corresponds to the growth of plant and animal communities,
on which the ﬁsh species in question is ecologically dependent, it is relevant to adopt the
same assumptions as for the ﬁsh growth rate F . There is a certain level of these plant
and animal populations beyond which their growth rate decreases due to environmental
saturation4.
4) Properties of the loss rate G(K,E) of the area's carrying capacity:
(4a) ∂G∂K > 0 and (4b)
∂G
∂E > 0;
For G we adopt the same assumptions as for the harvest function H. (4a) means
that larger habitats, and hence greater carrying capacity, provide more opportunities for
habitats to be impacted by ﬁshing, which implies higher losses in K. In the same vein,
(4b) states that the higher the ﬁshing pressure E on habitats, the more serious the damage
inﬂicted on them and thus the higher the losses in K.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Biological equilibrium with harvesting
Equilibria are determined and behavior of steady-states is analyzed. For this purpose, let
us consider that the ﬁshing eﬀort E is a parameter and analyze the solution of the system
of equations x˙ = K˙ = 0. Then the steady states of (7)-(8) are x∗1 = 0, x∗2 = K∗ − vrE
and K∗1 = 0, K∗2 = Kmax(1 − γτE). However, K∗1 is not acceptable because of the form
of the harvest function H. Hence system (7)-(8) has only two steady states (x∗1,K∗2 ) and
(x∗2,K∗2 ). The ﬁrst one is trivial and we focus on the positive equilibrium point (x∗2,K∗2 ).
4One of the reasons of saturation is that any marine area is geometrically limited. We assume that this
saturation threshold can be expressed in terms of carrying capacity.
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We now look at the behavior of the system at the steady state. To do this, the system
of equations (7)-(8) is linearized at (x∗2,K∗2 ). Then, we write the Jacobian of the system
V (x∗2,K∗2 ) =
(
vE
K∗2
− r r − vEK∗2
0 γE − τ
)
.
Due to the condition of positivity of x∗2 andK∗2 , we obtain negative eigen values
vE
K∗2
−r <
0 and γE − τ < 0. As a result, (x∗2,K∗2 ) is locally asymptotically stable.
The behavior of the model at the steady state depends on the ﬁshing eﬀort E. If no
ﬁshing takes place, i.e. E = 0, for non zero initial carrying capacity and ﬁsh stock, both
attain their maximum x∗ = Kmax, K∗ = Kmax. Fish stock and carrying capacity are
positive at the steady state if the eﬀort E < Kmax/(
γKmax
τ +
v
r ).
As we can see, the level of ﬁsh stock x at equilibrium depends on the area's carrying
capacity K. It increases with K and can collapse if eﬀort E is such that E = rKv . Thus,
for higher K, higher eﬀort can be applied without leading to a total shortage of the ﬁsh
population. Conversely, for lower K, lower eﬀort can result in ﬁsh collapse. Furthermore,
in addition to the usual constraint of ﬁsh stock positivity E < rKv , the ﬁshing eﬀort must
be suﬃciently low to keep the carrying capacity above zero, i.e. E < τγ , in order to avoid
a shortage of ﬁsh in the area.
The above analysis demonstrates that incorporating the dynamics of carrying capacity
provides a powerful tool to address the issue of ﬁsheries conservation. Through its equilib-
rium behavior, the model exhibits such features of marine ecosystems as the potential for
ﬁsh stock to collapse because of the destruction of habitats leading to decreased carrying
capacity. Thus, the biological and the economic arguments justifying habitat conservation
become obvious. The resource cannot be preserved without protecting habitats.
3.2 Biological and economic overﬁshing
Following Gordon (1954), under open access the ﬁshing eﬀort E increases while the eco-
nomic rent is positive because additional ﬁshing units are attracted to the ﬁshery. When
the rent is negative, some ﬁshing units withdraw from the ﬁshery, reducing the level of
eﬀort. Hence, in the open-access ﬁshery eﬀort tends to reach the bionomic equilibrium
where the rent dissipates.
Here the economic rent R is represented by the following function:
R(x,K,E) = p
vEx
K
− cE (9)
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where p is the constant price per unit of harvested ﬁsh and c is the constant cost per unit
of eﬀort. Price p and cost c are exogenous.
The bionomic equilibium is attained at
x∞ = cK∞pv , K∞ = Kmax/
(
1 + rγKmaxτv (1− cpv )
)
and
E∞ = KM
(
1− cpv
)
/
(
v
r +
γKM
τ
(
1− cpv
))
.
As in the G-S model, the eﬀort E∞ leading to rent dissipation depends on the economic
parameters of the ﬁshery p, c and catchability coeﬃcient v as well as on the intrinsic ﬁsh
growth rate r. However, in our model and as expected, it also depends on the parameters
τ and γ describing the dynamics of carrying capacity. Parameters c and γ are negatively
related to E∞ whereas p, r, τ and Kmax are positively related to it.
Clearly, in the model incorporating habitat considerations, equilibrium stock level and
equilibrium eﬀort diﬀer from those in the G-S model . Other things being equal, for a higher
rate of habitat rehabilitation (implying higher τ), higher eﬀort E∞ can be supported by
the ﬁshery at equilibrium. Similarly, a higher habitat degradation rate leads to lower E∞.
There is hence a strong link between habitat and ﬁshing eﬀort. Let us propose the following
framework to compare the standard G-S model and our extension. The carrying capacity
in the G-S model is taken to be the initial condition in our extended G-S model. It is
noted as K0. The density function is supposed to take the following form: ρ(t) = x(t)/K0.
In our variation of the G-S model, this deﬁnition of carrying capacity corresponds to the
initial carrying capacity K(0) = K0. In our notations, the eﬀort at bionomic equlibrium
calculated on the basis of the G-S model can be written as EGS∞ =
r
vK0(1− cpv ). Comparing
it with eﬀort that we obtained with the extension, it is easy to see that our model predicts
that the rent dissipates at a lower eﬀort than that stated by the G-S model. Supposing
that our formalization of the ﬁshery better describes the functionning of real ecosystems,
Gordon's recommendation to limit the access to the resource by EGS∞ is not suﬃcient to
avoid the dissipation of the rent.
It is well known that bionomic equilibrium describes the situation of economic overﬁsh-
ing in which an excessive level of eﬀort leads to a zero rent situation, although it can be
positive for lower eﬀort levels (Clark, 1990). Another type of overexploitation addressed
in Clark (1990) is the biological overﬁshing that occurs if the level of ﬁsh stock is lower
than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). Given K and for any given level of ﬁsh stock
x below K, there is a level of harvest H such that H = F (x) and H can be harvested
in perpetuity without altering the stock level. MSY is achieved for the population level
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x where the function F reaches its maximum. By deﬁnition, HMSY = maxF (x). These
conclusions are now discussed in our model. In this case, sustainable harvest H(x∗2,K∗2 , E)
is maximized at
xMSY = KMSY − vrEMSY ,
KMSY = Kmax
√
v/
(
rγKmax
τ + v
)
,
EMSY =
τ
γ
(
1−
√
v/
(
rγKmax
τ + v
))
.
Similarly to the G-S model, the eﬀort level that maximizes the sustainable harvest
depends only on parameters speciﬁc to ﬁsh stock and to carrying capacity dynamics. Note
also that the level of carrying capacity at which MSY is attained is not its maximum Kmax.
This result is not suprising because KMSY trades oﬀ posititive impact of K on harvest
function H via ﬁsh stock x and its negative relation to ﬁsh concentration. On the other
hand, the MSY recommendation calculated on the basis of the G-S model is to exert the
eﬀort EGSMSY =
rK0
2v . Since the model does not take into account the evolution of habitats,
i.e. parameterK0 is considered as constant, no recommendations are given regarding area's
carrying capacity. As a result, if K0 is lower than KMSY , then the MSY in the sense of
our model is not achieved and the resource faces biological overexploitation. Conversely, if
K0 is higher than KMSY the ﬁsh stock stabilizes at a level higher than xMSY .
This result is very important, because it illustrates how MSY based on the G-S model
could overestimate the capacity of the resource to support ﬁshing activities. This is consis-
tent with the widely observed failure of current management tools using MSY which stems
from the G-S model to preserve ﬁsheries, and underlines the need to integrate habitats into
the design of management plans, as put forward by many recent studies (see for instance
Naiman and Latterell (2005)).
4 Optimal harvesting
MSY guarantees the absence ofbiological overﬁshing. However, it does not guarantee that
the resource is not economically overexploited. We hence search for optimal harvesting
policy that maximizes the total discounted net revenues of a ﬁshery.
4.1 Economic interpretation of necessary optimality conditions
Consider a sole owner for this ﬁshery (government agency or private ﬁrm), having complete
knowledge of and control over the ﬁsh population. According to economic theory, the owner
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of the resource seeks to maximize the total discounted present value of economic proﬁts.
In our framework, we get the following optimization problem:
Max
06E6EM
J{E} =
∞∫
0
e−δtR(x,E,K)dt (10)
x˙ = F (x,K)−H(x,E,K),
K˙ = D(K)−G(E,K),
x(0) = x0,
K(0) = K0
where E is a control variable and δ denotes the discount rate.
Integration of the dynamics of carrying capacity into the model provides new insight
into the interpretation of the objective functional. The owner of the resource takes into
account, among other things, the degradation of habitats caused by aggressive ﬁshing
through the dynamics of carrying capacity, when he decides on eﬀort policy. Economic
proﬁt is now determined not only via the usual two factors, E and x, but also via a new
factor, potentially impacting proﬁts, K.
Optimal ﬁsheries management can be viewed as a problem of optimal strategy for
investment in assets in order to maximize the proﬁtability of the ﬁshery. In this case, the
objective of the resource owner is interpreted in terms of capital assets. He expects the
asset to earn dividends. Contrary to the G-S model, here there are two capital assets - ﬁsh
stock and carrying capacity - where the latter inﬂuences the former 5. In order to solve
this maximization problem, we build its Hamiltonian:
H(x,K, t, E, λ, µ) = R(x,K,E) + λ(F (x,K)−H(x,K,E)) + µ(D(K)−G(K,E)), (11)
where, as usual, λ(t) can be interpreted as the shadow price of a ﬁsh "in the sea" and µ(t)
as the shadow price of the carrying capacity of the marine area.
Three terms on the right side of the expression (11) are value ﬂows: the ﬁrst denotes
the ﬂow of proﬁts at time t in the objective functional J ; the second can be viewed as the
investment ﬂow in the ﬁsh stock x at time t ; the last term is a new one and denotes the
ﬂow of investment in carrying capacity K at time t. Thus the Hamiltonian H(.) represents
the total rate of increase of proﬁts and of both capital assets.
5The possibility of the inverse is not taken into account in our model.
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Along with the two capital assets, two types of production are involved in the Hamil-
tonian H. First, ﬁshing units "produce" ﬁsh by harvesting. Second, they accidentally
"remove" a certain number of habitats due to agressive ﬁshing (for instance, removal or
scattering of non-target benthos in the case of bottom-ﬁshing gear). Since removal of
habitat substrate, fauna or ﬂora reduces carrying capacity, we can speak of "removal" of
carrying capacity. The ﬁrst is a product that can be sold on the market, whereas the
second can be viewed almost as a bycatch.
Thus, the optimal control E(t) must maximize the rate of increase of total assets.
Given the linear form of the harvest and cost functions (see equations (6) and (9)), the
Hamiltonian (11) depends linearly on E with coeﬃcient
σ = p
∂H
∂E
− c− λ∂H
∂E
− µ∂G
∂E
(12)
referred to as the switching function. In this case three solutions for E are possible: either
the extremes 0 or EM , or an interior solution E
∗. When σ is positive, i.e. the shadow
prices λ and µ are suﬃciently low, there should be as much ﬁshing as possible. When σ is
negative, i.e. the shadow prices λ and µ are suﬃciently high, there should be no ﬁshing.
When σ is nul, the control E should be set at its singular value E∗.
With respect to this, by the Pontryagin conditions, we have :
λ˙ = δλ− ∂H
∂x
= δλ− p∂H
∂x
− λ
(
∂F
∂x
− ∂H
∂x
)
, (13)
µ˙ = δµ− ∂H
∂K
= δµ− p∂H
∂K
− λ
(
∂F
∂K
− ∂H
∂K
)
− µ
(
∂D
∂K
− ∂G
∂K
)
. (14)
For singular control we obtain:
(p− λ)∂H
∂E
= c+ µ
∂G
∂E
. (15)
This equation states that the last unit of eﬀort is such that the net value of the marginal
product (its market price if caught minus its shadow price if uncaught) equals marginal
user cost. The marginal user cost consists of the marginal cost of eﬀort and the cost due
to damaging marine habitats (shadow value of "removed" carrying capacity).
Write (13) and (14) as:
(p− λ)∂H
∂x
+ λ˙ = δλ− λ∂F
∂x
, (16)
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(p− λ)∂H
∂K
+ µ˙ = δµ− λ ∂F
∂K
− µ
(
∂D
∂K
− ∂G
∂K
)
. (17)
The left-hand side of the expression (16) is the marginal net payoﬀ from an uncaught
ﬁsh i.e. the value of the marginal product of a ﬁsh in the sea plus gains from ﬁsh capital.
The right-hand side is the marginal net cost of an uncaught ﬁsh i.e. the "ﬁnancial cost" of
an uncaught ﬁsh minus (plus) the value of "appreciation" (depreciation) at the "biological
own rate of interest".
In the same manner, the left-hand side of (17) is recognized as the marginal net payoﬀ
from the carrying capacity not impacted by ﬁshing. The right-hand side is the marginal
net cost. There are four terms describing user costs:
• "ﬁnancial cost" of not "removing" carrying capacity,
• plus (minus) value of depreciation (appreciation) of ﬁsh capital,
• plus (minus) value of depreciation (appreciation) of carrying capacity capital,
• plus (minus) value of marginal increase (decrease) of carrying capacity loss rate in-
duced by ﬁshing.
To summarize, taking habitats into consideration through carrying capacity results
in a more complex optimization problem. The regulator has to ﬁnd a tradeoﬀ not only
between proﬁts from a ﬁsh being caught and the ensuing loss in ﬁsh capital, but also
between economic beneﬁts derived from damaging habitats and loss of carrying capacity
capital.
4.2 Optimal steady state
We seek now to characterize steady state in this optimal problem. In view of the model
speciﬁcation (7)-(8), the Hamiltonian (11) is rewritten as:
H =
(pvx
K
− c
)
E + λ
(
rx
(
1− x
K
)
− vEx
K
)
+ µ
(
τK
(
1− K
Kmax
)
− γEK
)
. (18)
The switching function and co-state equations are as follows:
σ =
pvx
K
− c− λvx
K
− µγK; (19)
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λ˙ =
(
δ − r + 2rx
K
+
vE
K
)
λ− pvE
K
; (20)
µ˙ =
(
δ − τ + 2τK
Kmax
+ γE
)
µ−
(
rx2
K2
+
vEx
K2
)
λ+
pvEx
K2
. (21)
Since, with more than one state equation, the Pontryagin conditions are considerably
more complicated, we focus attention on the interior equilibrium solution. We hence equal-
ize state, costate and switching equations to zero:
x˙ = 0 =⇒ x = K − vE
r
; (22)
K˙ = 0 =⇒ K = Kmax
(
1− γE
τ
)
; (23)
λ˙ = 0 =⇒ λ = pvE/K
δ + f
; (24)
µ˙ = 0 =⇒ µ = λx
K
(
r − δ − f
δ + g
)
; (25)
pvx
K
− c− λvx
K
− µγK = 0, (26)
where f = − (∂F∂x − Fx ) = rxK and g = − ( dDdK − DK ) = τKKmax .
The expression (22) represents the standard condition of sustainable yield H that can
be harvested while maintaining a ﬁxed population level x. In similar way, equation (23)
describes sustainable a amount G of carrying capacity that can be lost while maintaining
a ﬁxed level K.
It is obvious that the shadow price λ is strictly positive. If E < rKq (condition of
ﬁsh stock positivity), meaning that a ﬁsh in the sea has a nonzero value. Therefore, the
regulator is incited to invest in the resource's future productivity and not to harvest all the
ﬁsh instantaneously. The positivity of µ is not as obvious: it depends on the relationship
between parameters r, δ and f . The holder of carrying capacity capital is incited to invest
in it if r > δ + f . If δ > r, which means in simple language that money-in-the-bank at
interest rate δ grows faster (or at the same rate) than a ﬁsh in the sea. This makes the
option of ﬁshing at the risk of decreasing the carrying capacity of the marine area more
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attractive than trying to avoid losses in carrying capacity for future proﬁts.
By virtue of (24) and (25), the equation (26) is rewritten as
x
(
1− vE/K
δ + f
− γE(r − δ − f)
(δ + f)(δ + g)
)
=
cK
pv
. (27)
When the future is entirely discounted so that δ = +∞, the equation (26) simpliﬁes
to x = cKpv , which corresponds to the dissipation of economic rent. It also can be veriﬁed
that the case of δ = 0 where future revenues are weighted equally with current revenues
corresponds to the maximization of sustainable rent. Moreover both x∗ and K∗ satisfying
(27) decrease with increasing δ toward x∞ and K∞ respectively. Our problem therefore
possesses an equilibrium solution verifying the necessary Pontryagin conditions.
After some calculations we get
x∗ = Kmax −
(
v
r
+
γKmax
τ
)
E∗, (28)
K∗ = Kmax
(
1− γE
∗
τ
)
, (29)
λ∗ =
pvE∗
Kmax(δ + r)−
(
v − γKmaxτ (δ + r)
)
E∗
, (30)
µ∗ =
λ∗x∗
K∗
(
vE∗/K∗ − δ
δ + τ − γE∗
)
, (31)
where E∗ is a root of the following polynomial of degree 3:
a0E
3 + a1E
2 + a2E + a3 = 0, (32)
with
a0 = −γ[(rγKmax + τv)2 − rγKmax cpv (δγKmax + rγKmax + τv)];
a1 = (rγKmax + τv)(δ
2γKmax + τ(3rγKmax + 2τv) + δ(2τv + γKmax(r + τ)))−
−rγKmax cpv (δ2γKmax + τ(3rγKmax + 2τv) + δ(τv + γKmax(r + 3τ)));
a2 = τKmax[r
c
pv (2δ
2γKmax + τ(3rγKmax + τv) + δ(2rγKmax + 3τγKmax + τv)) −
(3rτ(rγKmax + τv) + δ
2(2rγKmax + τv) + δ(2rγKmax(r + τ) + τv(3r + τ)))];
a3 = rτ
2K2max (δ + r) (δ + τ)
(
1− cpv
)
.
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The term a3 is positive due to the natural constraint of nonnegative sustainable eco-
nomic rent that is satiﬁed for cpv < 1. Thusfor any set of parameters such that a0 < 0, we
can guarantee that this polynomial has at least one positive root. Imposing negativity on
a0 means constraining the ratio
c
pv by some upper bound i.e.
c
pv <
(rγKmax+τv)2
rγKmax(δγKmax+rγKmax+τv)
.
The equation (32) can have up to three real positive solutions, one of which is the
optimal singular control. It is not easy to interpret the equilibrium solution from an
economic point of view. Furthermore, it seems to be diﬃcult to determine the optimal
approach path, unlike the one-dimensional model for which the optimal transition is the
most rapid approach path. What we do know is that it consists of bang-bang (when the
control variable takes on its extreme values) and singular controls. In Appendix A, we
calculate optimal steady state solution for a given set of model parameters (their values
are presented in Table 1). We give results for three diﬀerent values of discount rate δ (see
Table 3). In this numerical example, we obtain a unique solution to (22)-(26).
5 What the simulations reveal?
This section presents results obtained using an heuristic model to simulate6 our extended
G-S model that permits habitats to be taken into account. The values of model parameters
are given in Table 1.
In the ﬁrst simulation we observe what happens when recommendations yielded by
G-S model such as MSY and MEY are applied in the framework of the extended model
(see Table 2). The goal of the second simulation is to show how the extended G-S model
provides an appropriate framework to explore ecosystem based management tools more
speciﬁcally MPAs ans ARs.
Simulations take equations (7)-(8) as baseline model.
x˙ = rx
(
1− x
K
)
− vEx
K
, (33)
K˙ = τK
(
1− K
Kmax
)
− γEK (34)
where x(0) = x0 and K(0) = K0
6Simulations were performed via the modelling environment ModelMaker.
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Table 1: Model parameters.
Ecological parameters Value Unit
r 0, 5 year−1
τ 0, 01 year−1
γ 0, 00001 year−1
Kmax 5000000 kg
Economic parameters Value Unit
p 15 euros
c 100 euros per unit of eﬀort
v 20 year−1 per unit of density
n 0, 0001 year−1
Initial conditions Value Unit
x0 200000 kg
K0 500000 kg
E0 170 vessel-days
Table 2: Eﬀort levels corresponding to diﬀerent reference points.
Reference point G-S model Extended G-S model
Bionomic equilibrium EGS∞ = 8333 E∞ = 988
Maximum Sustainable Yield EGSMSY = 6250 EMSY = 910
Maximum Economic Yield EGSMEY = 4198 EMEY = 891
When we assume open access to a ﬁshery, we need to describe the dynamics of eﬀort to
implement simulations. For the sake of interpretation, the open access ﬁshery is depicted
here by the dynamic model of Smith (1968) which links the entry and exit of ﬁshing units
to the level of proﬁtability, here R = (pvxK − c)E. Then the eﬀort dynamics is as follows:
E˙ = n
(pvx
K
− c
)
E, (35)
where n is an adjustment parameter and E(0) = E0 is initial eﬀort. The model of Smith
replicates the main result of Gordon (1954) namely that the economic rent dissipates at
equilibrium if access is not regulated.
5.1 Do habitats matter?
A ﬁrst set of simuations compare how "Open Access" scenario works with the extended
G-S model (equations (7), (8) and (38)) and with the standard G-S model (equations
(7) and (38)). At equilibrium, the stock and the carrying capacity in the extended G-S
model (green curves) are lower than in the G-S model (red curves), as depicted in Figure
19
2. Although this result is rather technical since it arises from introducing in the model
the possibility that the ﬁshers decrease carrying capacity when they are ﬁshing, it is yet
based on real observations that carrying capacity declines when the ﬁshers deteriorate the
habitats. In light of this, we argue that habitats do matter and a policy conceived without
taking into account this component of a marine ecosystem could be irrelevant.
Figure 2: Open access: G-S model vs. Extended G-S model
Indicators such as MSY and MEY, which are guidelines for ﬁsheries management,
need to be carefully determined in order to design eﬃcient management tools. They are
usually based on the G-S model, where habitat issues are omitted. Suppose, as we claim,
that habitats do matter; then by using the extended G-S model that integrates carrying
capacity dynamics, we can expect to obtain a better description of the behavior of marine
ecosystems and ﬁshery dynamics. We show below that sticking to the G-S framework will
result in ecosystem and ﬁshery collapses because of the excessive ﬁshing eﬀort produced
by the model.
First eﬀort levels EGSMSY and E
GS
MEY corresponding to MSY and MEY, are determined
from the G-S model (see Table 2); second we calculate EMSY and EMEY relying on the
extended framework of G-S model developed herein (see Table 2). We use the parameter
values in Table 1 and formulas from the previous sections. Figure 3 illustrates the behavior
of the system when eﬀort is restricted to MSY eﬀort level. Recall that, theorically, this
eﬀort level leads to a level of catch that can be harvested in perpetuity without altering the
stock of the resource. Thus, the level of ﬁshing eﬀort is taken as constant and equals EGSMSY
for the red curve and EMSY for the green curve. Three trajectories are simulated: ﬁsh
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stock, carrying capacity and economic proﬁt. As expected, all three trajectories described
by green curves converge to calculated equilibrium levels (see Table 3). Conversely, the
red curves portray the collapse of the system driven by excessive ﬁshing pressure. The
same reasoning is applicable to MEY (see Figure 4). If the "true" model is the extended
G-S model, applying EGSMEY does not imply maximization of proﬁts but quite the contrary:
proﬁt decrease sharply until it becomes negative.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that leaving habitat considerations out of the analysis
leads to considerably overestimated of MSY and MEY and therefore to resource collapse.
If such recommendations are used in the design, for example, of a TAC regime, the limits
for TACs will be several times the acceptable amount. Thus, even with TACs, ﬁsh stock
and ﬁsheries risk rapid depletion and collapse.
Figure 3: Maximum Sustainable Yield: G-S model vs. Extended G-S model.
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Figure 4: Maximum Economic Yield: G-S model vs. Extended G-S model.
5.2 Solving the problem of habitat management
Consider a marine area with poor habitats. In the extended G-S model, poor habitats can
be interpreted by low initial level of carrying capacity, denoted asK(0). In order to preserve
the resource and its associated ﬁshery, recommendations may include MPAs, gear zoning
or area rotation depending on particular gear and habitat type (Guillén et al., 1994). The
use of ARs has also been suggested as a way to prevent trawling which greatly damages
marine habitats (see for instance, Jennings and Kaiser (1998), Turner et al. (1999)) or
to favor reproduction of ﬁsh populations by providing means of survival (Pickering and
Whitmarsh, 1997). This wide range of policies could not previously be properly assessed
on the basis of the G-S model. Yet their assessment becomes possible using the extended
model developed herein.
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In the present paper, the following policies are considered: gear restriction, MPAs, ARs
and optimal ﬁsheries management (as described in the previous section). All of them focus
on preserving both ﬁshery proﬁtability and the marine ecosystem. For resource managers,
combining both objectives is the main characteristic of sustainable management.
5.2.1 Gear restriction
One way to respect the marine environment is to forbid the use of aggressive ﬁshing gear.
From this perspective, we understand by gear restriction the use of habitat-frendly tech-
niques which have no negative impact on marine habitats. Gear restriction policy can be
enforced by immersing ARs of protection that prevent the use of aggressive ﬁshing tech-
niques such as bottom trawling. In the open access ﬁshery, we propose to model the impact
of habitat-frendly techniques by adapting model (7)-(8) and (38) in the following manner
(the second part of equation (8) disappears, i.e. loss rate G = 0):
x˙ = rx
(
1− x
K
)
− vEx
K
, (36)
K˙ = τK
(
1− K
Kmax
)
, (37)
E˙ = n
(pvx
K
− c
)
E, (38)
where x(0) = x0, K(0) = K0 and E(0) = E0.
Our benchmark is what we have called the baseline model (equations (7), (8) and (38)).
Under gear restriction the carrying capacity of the area increases until Kmax (green curve
in Figure 5). In the short term, we observe higher economic proﬁt than in the situation
where no gear restriction is put into place (red curve). However, in the long term, the rent
dissipates, as expected in the open access ﬁshery. Yet, ﬁsh stock and carrying capacity
do better than in the absence of gear restriction. Moreover, the area can support higher
ﬁshing eﬀort, since the techniques employed are habitat-friendly and, thereby, have no
impact on habitats.
5.2.2 Is it necessary to manage access to ARs?
ARs of production are usually implemented in marine areas with highly disturbed habitats.
By providing additional means for ﬁsh survival, they are expected to enhance the area's
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Figure 5: Open access vs. Gear restriction.
carrying capacity and ﬁsh stock. These controversial issues obviously need to be addressed
in collaboration with marine biologists, as organized in the workshop at the University
of the Mediterranean (Marseille) in 2010. Here, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume
that ARs of production are immersed and their eﬀect on the area's carrying capacity is
instantaneous. We also assume that it is possible to estimate what size, quantity and
structure of ARs will lead to instantaneous increase in carrying capacity such that K(0) =
K∗, the optimal steady state level determined in the previous section taking discount rate
δ = 0, 01 (see Table 3 in Appendix A).
Three scenarios are simulated in this subsection:
1. Benchmark still described by the baseline model (7)-(8) and (38) with initial condi-
tions K(0) = K0, x(0) = x0 and E(0) = E0;
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2. ARs under open access modelled by equations (7)-(8) and (38) but whereK(0) = K∗,
x(0) = x0 and E(0) = E0;
3. ARs with regulated access modelled by equations (7)-(8) but where K(0) = K∗,
x(0) = x0 and E(0) = E
∗.
Fish stock, carrying capacity, ﬁshing eﬀort and economic proﬁt are the indicators ob-
served. Their trajectories are presented in Figure 6.
When open access (red curve) and ARs under open access (green curve) are compared,
several points emerge. Fish stock and carrying capacity increase in the short term in the
latter scenario, followed by a decrease, so that the curve joins the red one. These mo-
mentary ecological beneﬁts yielded by ARs open up proﬁtable opportunities for expanding
ﬁshing eﬀort further than with the open access scenario. This is one of the negative eﬀects
from immersion of ARs without appropriate management. Very similar eﬀect is also re-
vealed for MPAs (for instance, see Boncoeur et al. (2002)) which lose their positive impact
when ﬁshing eﬀort is not regulated.
In the third scenario we set the initial ﬁshing eﬀort to its optimal steady state level,
i.e. E(0) = E∗ throughout simulation (blue line). We also set initial condition on carrying
capacity to its optimal level K(0) = K∗. Under these conditions, we simulate stock, carry-
ing capacity and proﬁt dynamics. Since we start with optimal steady state level, carrying
capapcity remains at the same level K∗ throughout the simulation. At the beginning of
the simulation, ﬁsh stock and proﬁt increase and converge to their steady state level (see
Table 3 in Appendix A). As expected, this scenario leads to higher long-term proﬁts than
previous scenarios (the blue curve is higher than the red and green ones). This policy also
results in a better ecological situation as measured by ﬁsh stock and carrying capacity,
than previous scenarios.
This simple analysis supports the claim of Pickering and Whitmarsh (1997) that the
ecological and economic beneﬁts of ARs are short-term and dissipate in the long term,
which illustrates the need to manage access to ARs areas.
5.3 Capturing the full eﬀects of MPAs
The large body of literature on MPAs is based on the G-S model. However, MPAs are
expected not only to increase ﬁsh biomass but also to favor the recovery of habitats located
within their boundaries. While the ﬁrst eﬀect may be captured by the G-S model, the eﬀect
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Figure 6: Open access vs. ARs under open access vs. ARs under optimal steady state
eﬀort.
of habitat conservation on ﬁsh reproduction may not. In contrast, the extended G-S model
is able to give a better idea of what happens at the ecosystem level (see Figure 7)7.
Figure 7 shows the interaction between ﬁsh stock dynamics and carrying capacity re-
vealed by the extended G-S model and its absence in the G-S model. It is precisely this
eﬀect that we set out to capture.
6 Conclusion
First, it has been demonstrated that habitats matter since, the main outcomes of the G-
S model are dramatically modiﬁed if habitat dynamics is included in the analysis. This
7To model MPA policy, we set eﬀort E to 0.
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Figure 7: No-take zone: G-S model vs Extended G-S model.
result is consistent with the claims of marine biologist and marine managers that habitat
deterioration is one of the most important factor in the decline of ﬁsheries in many areas
in the world. From this point of view, our extended G-S model should be more relevant
to the design ﬁshery policies. Second, through a heuristic model and simulations, we have
shown how the extended G-S model provides a better understanding of common habitat
protection policies like MPAs and ARs. This new model allows policy makers to set targets
in terms of optimal amount of carrying capacity necessary to maximize thz proﬁts derived
from a ﬁshery. Equilibrium analysis comparing standard ﬁshery indicators such as resource
stocks and ﬁshing eﬀort associated with MSY and MEY reveals how important habitats
are. More precisely, we ﬁnd that ﬁshing eﬀort associated with MSY and MEY, calculated
from G-S model are systematically higher than those calculated from the extended G-S
model. Thus, if habitats are indeed signiﬁcantly impacted by ﬁshing activities, we can
conclude that ﬁshery policies like TACs, where allowable catch levels are determined using
the G-S model, systematically permits more harvesting than the ecosystem can support.
This misspeciﬁcation of eﬀort and catch may explain why some resource stocks and their
associated ﬁsheries have collapsed. Similar misspeciﬁcations are found at biological and
bionomic equilibria.
To guide policymakers in the design of habitat protection policies for optimal ﬁsheries
management, some analytical results are given herein. They imply the existence of optimal
levels for both carrying capacity and ﬁshing eﬀort. Information on those levels could help
managers to design sustainable marine policies, by taking into account both ecosystem
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and ﬁshery proﬁtability. Such policies could well include MPAs and ARs which have
been applied worldwide as a means of habitat rehabilitation and protection. But they are
controversial both extensively debated and extensively used.
The extended G-S model provides ﬁrst theoretical support for implementing these
ecosystem-based management tools because it oﬀers an appropriate framework for analysing
the economic beneﬁts of MPAs and ARs. In others words, it explain why the Habitat Di-
rective recommendations make sense.
Moreover, this framework allows us to distinguish between the eﬀects of ARs and
those of MPAs. In constrast to existing models, our model clearly establishes the relative
eﬀectiveness of both policies in habitat protection and shows how they achieve it.
With MPAs, ﬁsh and habitat are protected by eliminating ﬁshing pressure in protected
areas. With Ars, ﬁsh and habitat conservation are ensured through the creation of new
habitats.
It is true that for the purposes of this study, we have adopted certain simplifying
assumptions. While biologists themselves argue the existence of a link between habitat
and carrying capacity, the latter is likely to be weaker than we suppose in this study where
we have assumed that they are interchangeable. Further studies could well challenge this
view, adding to the debate among biologists about production and concentration eﬀects of
ARs.
To study the concentration eﬀect a patchy model in which resource stock will be able to
move from one patch to another is required. Nevertheless, we have established a framework
allowing ﬁsheries management to be analyzed at ecosystem level. The extended G-S model
we present here could be adapted to integrate heterogeneity of habitats and ﬁsh stocks by
extending to going towards spatial and multi-species models.
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8 Appendix A
Level of ﬁsh stock, carrying capacity and eﬀort at bionomic equilibrium, MSY and optimal
steady state are summarized in Table 3. It also conveys the impact of discount rate δ on
the optimal level of eﬀort E∗. Recall that from previous sections, we know that optimal
steady state eﬀort is positively related to discount rate: the more the resource manager is
concerned about future beneﬁts (lower δ), the lower eﬀort he applies. According to Table
3, ﬁsh stock and carrying capacity are negatively related to discount rate: their equilibrium
values increase as δ decreases and approach the MEY level. Conversely, when δ increases,
the optimal steady state coverges toward bionomic equilibrium.
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Table 3: Reference points and optimal values provided by the extended G-S model.
Bionomic equilibrium Value Unit
x∞ 19763 kg
K∞ 59289 kg
E∞ 988 vessel-days
Maximum Sustainable Yield Value Unit
xMSY 409005 kg
KMSY 445442 kg
EMSY 911 vessel-days
Optimal steady state and control δ = 0 Value Unit
x∗ 508822 kg
K∗ 544466 kg
E∗ 891 vessel-days
Optimal steady state and control for δ = 0, 005 Value Unit
x∗ 170904 kg
K∗ 209230 kg
E∗ 958 vessel-days
Optimal steady state and control for δ = 0, 05 Value Unit
x∗ 77423 kg
K∗ 116491 kg
E∗ 977 vessel-days
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